Bluetooth Security Architecture
Short summary:
This White Paper describes a flexible security. architecture for Bluetooth that allows different ... level security mechanisms of Bluetooth to enforce ...
Long summary:
Bluetooth Security Architecture Bluetooth WHITE PAPER Bluetooth Security Architecture Version 1.0 This White Paper describes a flexible security architecture for Bluetooth that allows different security levels for applications. While Bluetooth provides link-level authentication and encryption, enforcing at only this level prevents user-friendly access to more public-oriented usage models such as discovering services and exchanging business cards. This architecture uses the linklevel security mechanisms of Bluetooth to enforce the service level security policy (security mode 2) of the Generic Access Profile. RESPONSIBLE DATE N.B. 15 July 99 E-MAIL ADDRESS thomas.t.muller@nmp.nokia.com STATUS DOCUMENT NO. 1.C.116/1.0 Thomas Muller Bluetooth Security Architecture of 33 Introduction 15 July 1999 2 Special Interest Group (SIG) The following companies are represented in the Bluetooth Special Interest Group: Ericsson Mobile Communications AB IBM Corp. Intel Corp. Nokia Mobile Phones Toshiba Corp. Revision History Revision Date Comments 0.0 1999-03-29 first draft, based on discussion at the SW face-to-face meeting in chandler, AZ 0.0.1 1999-03-30 Requirement on limited user intervention added 2 requirements in question added Start work on procedures (general behavior, Handling of RFCOMM) 0.0.2 1999-04-01 Incorporated feedback from Paul and Chatschik 0.0.3 1999-04-07 Feedback from Brian Redding 0.1 1999-04-09 Integrate decisions from the meeting 1999-04-08 Add interfaces of the security manager 0.2 1999-04-16 Modifications to the interfaces of the security manager: Queries from L2CAP and other protocols harmonised Only BD_ADDR used in query Entity taking care of registration is implementation dependent. Registration moved to a separate section; interface to applications removed. UI: set-up of trusted relationship included Security Policy for changed connection (section 2.1): wording changed to reflect that this includes client and server role. Section 3.1: Pairing removed registration can also be done by general management entity. Bluetooth Security Architecture of 33 Introduction 15 July 1999 3 0.3 1999-04-27 Remove parts for L2CAP connection hold after BB loss, because not supported by L2CAP any more: mainly changes in 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. Flow chart changed according to phone meeting April 21 st and included in document Requirements for service security levels (requirement 3) corrected. Changes to distinguish between outgoing and incoming connections: Default security level (in section 3.2.3) Interface for registration: levels for both incoming and outgoing connections separately defined Query to security manager: attribute for incoming/outgoing connection added Changes to make authentication mandatory in case authorisation is required: Statements in 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 0.5 1999-05-16 Security levels for registering multiplexing protocols added in section 3.6.5. Incorporate the changes agreed upon at the interoperability face-to-face meeting in Tampere: ...
Source: cnscenter.future.co.kr
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